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1 An Uneasy Couple 
 
The relationship between societies and their economies has been interpreted in many different 
ways in social and political thought. This relationship is so fundamental to understanding what 
goes on within a society that it was chosen as the title for the major work of Max Weber (1921), 
the founder of modern German sociology. Is the economy only one of many sectors of social life, 
subject to the same patterns as other parts of society (Parsons 1951; Luhmann 1984)? Or is it 
rather the underlying centre of power that moves the other parts of society, even if this is not 
always clearly recognizable (Marx 1867)? Is the logic of the homo oeconomicus so compelling 
that even areas as far removed from economics as the family and religious life are best 
understood using the tools of the economic sciences (Becker 1981)? Or, by contrast, do economic 
and non-economic processes and structures interpenetrate to such a degree that economic activity 
is always embedded in non-economic structures; and, conversely, does the logic of economics, 
especially individual or collective cost-benefit analysis, have a role to play in other spheres of life 
as well (Granovetter 1992)? Results from social and cultural anthropology (Polanyi 1957) and 
economic history (Braudel 1979; Wallerstein 1976) show that the relationship between 
economics and society is not constant. The more complex the structure of a society, and the more 
decentralized its structures of political power, the more an economy will "liberate" itself from its 
societal basis. The more these structural requirements are fulfilled, the more strongly an economy 
will develop a momentum of its own and ultimately shape the dynamics of the whole of 
society—or at least threaten to do so. It is difficult to deny that such a dominance of only one of 
many forms of social intercourse is problematic in more than one respect.  
Together with this diagnostic question, we must also ask about the appropriate scientific 
strategy and the relevance of the various specialized sciences—is it sociology or economics that 
can best help us understand society? According to one polemical saying, economics deals with 
how people make decisions, while sociology is concerned with why they have no choice in the 
first place. When read against its polemic grain, this saying actually highlights the 
complementarity of these different perspectives. This is particularly relevant in a situation in 
which the relationship between national economies and national polities, which has remained 
relatively stable and balanced for decades, is shaken by an acceleration of economic 
globalization. With globalization, increasingly large parts of the population realize that the 
enormous difference in mobility between territorially bound political structures and de-
territorialized markets and corporations creates a power imbalance between economic and 
political actors. This in turn threatens to hollow out political democracy to a previously unknown 
extent (Antille/Bürgenmeier/Flückiger 1997). Within this new context, the attitudes of 
disillusioned citizens will no longer be "they'll do what they want anyway" but rather "why care 
about voting if the really important decisions are taken elsewhere".  
 For a long time, social and economic developments in Switzerland appear to have 
progressed more gradually and to have been less concentrated than in other Western countries. 
The process of industrialization itself did not set in late—on the contrary, not many European 
countries experienced an "industrialization before industrialization" that went as far as it did in 
Switzerland—but it progressed less abruptly. The same can be said of the 20th Century, above all 
because Switzerland was only marginally, and not militarily, involved in the two World Wars. 
Did this reduce the ability of Switzerland’s economic and social structures to adapt to changing 
international conditions because production structures and styles remained intact, while 
elsewhere it was necessary to rebuild new and therefore more modern structures? Or did the 
relatively high standard of living in Switzerland make it possible, especially through the 
importation of foreign labour, to protect entire sectors from international competition and its 
inherent pressure to innovate? Or is Switzerland today suffering from a surplus of democracy, 
because too many interest groups, institutions and political subsystems participate in important 
decisions, and are able to block necessary changes at a time when the pie to be divided is no 
longer growing, thus turning most strategic choices into zero-sum games with winners and losers 
(Borner/Brunetti 1990)? 
Only very few of these questions can be answered in a satisfactory manner in the present 
chapter—in part because the relevant research is underdeveloped. This is also the reason why the 
basic features and trends discussed below represent a sample that depends on the choice of the 
observer.1 The authors list those features which they consider the most influential in the present 
as well as in the long term.  
 
 
2 Economic Structure 
 
Basic features 
In important respects, the structure of the Swiss economy has not only developed differently from 
that of its neighbours but it also differs from the conception many Swiss have of it. Switzerland, 
as opposed to most other European countries, experienced a phase of proto-industrialization, 
especially in the 18th Century, which meant that many regions engaged in forms of serial 
production of high-value products (textiles, watches) even before the actual industrial revolution 
(Bergier 1983). In contrast to the early phases of industrialization in England, Germany, France 
and other countries, which led to the creation of large new industrial cities and regions, large-
scale mass production hardly developed in Switzerland, restricted as it was to those regions 
which produced the natural resources it required. Early industrial development in Switzerland 
was decentralized, partly “pushed” by the resistance of the powerful guilds in the cities (who 
prohibited urban industrialization), and partly “pulled” by the relative abundance of water power 
and cheap manpower in the rural areas. Thus, industrial production often developed quite far 
from the large cities (such as in the canton of Glarus and in the Jura mountains). This production 
was largely oriented toward the export market, whether to Europe or to the colonies (whereas 
Switzerland was not involved in colonial military activities and their costs). Textiles were the 
leading product until the inter-War period of the 20th Century.2 In the most important sectors 
(above all, textiles and watches), Swiss industry was able very early on to secure a 
disproportionately strong position on international markets. In the 20th Century, the strong foreign 
orientation of the Swiss economy was also manifest in other sectors, such as the banking and 
insurance industries, as well as in the area of direct investment, where Swiss capital has been an 
international heavyweight for decades. This is also the reason why, on the international stage, the 
Swiss economy has an importance that goes far beyond what would be commensurate with the 
size of the country and its population, even though in absolute terms it is much more modest than 
that of the large nations in the world market.3  
 Decentralized industrialization led to a certain stabilization of the rural population in the 
regions concerned and slowed migration to the cities. However, “decentralized” in this context 
should not be misunderstood as territorially expansive. Early industrialization, with its specific 
organization in the form of the « cottage industry », influenced eastern Switzerland, Basle and its 
environs and the Jura, but not central Switzerland, the Bernese Mittelland, or the cantons of 
Grisons, Valais and Ticino. The Sonderbund war of 1847 was not least a revolt of the poor rural 
Catholic cantons against the rich industrialized Protestant cities, whose openness to the world and 
to change was seen by the agricultural world and its elites as threatening rather than as promising. 
In rural areas, poverty was widespread well into the 19th Century, and industrial development 
presumably benefited from it. It was above all for economic reasons that, for centuries, 
Switzerland was a European emigration state par excellence as well as a source of mercenaries. 
The Swiss migration statistics show that immigration exceeded emigration only after 1880.   
Poverty was primarily a rural phenomenon; until the second half of the 20th Century, the 
real poor in Switzerland were the mountain farmers.4 In 1880, only 21 percent of workers were 
employed in the industrial sector, and only half of these in factories; the rest worked in cottage 
industries, which minimized infrastructure costs for producers. It was only at the end of the 19th 
Century, under pressure from the increasingly powerful unions and in light of the new factory 
laws, that the general situation of the workers was improved.5 Only in the second half of the 19th 
Century did workers' pay begin to exceed subsistence levels and only then did the norm prevail 
that a worker’s pay should nourish his whole family (more or less in parallel with the prohibition 
of children’s and mothers’ employment). 
 The early and decentralized introduction of industrial production probably contributed 
decisively to the fact that the "revolution" remained technological and never became socio-
political. The radical political change that had led to the toppling of the ancien régime at the end 
of the 18th century was only possible due to the military intervention of the Napoleonic army; a 
half-century was then necessary until a new, stable political structure was established (i.e., with 
the Constitution of 1848). This structure included strong elements of federalism, which remained 
important despite the enormous dynamism brought on by the creation of a unitary, national 
economic space (through abolition of internal tariffs and of cantonal currencies). For instance, 
many firms that operated across cantonal boundaries retained organizational structures according 
to cantons, as did political systems, schools, churches and unions; cantonal economies were 
consolidated by the cantonal banks (Kantonalbanken). Cantonal regulations containing market 
limitations still contribute to a territorial de facto segmentation of the internal market. 
This particular path to industrialization brought about many of the characteristics that typify the 
economic structure of Switzerland to this day: 
• relatively complex and extensive regional economic areas, which survive remarkably 
well, despite a growing focus on the export market; 
• a large number of mid- to small-sized urban centres, notwithstanding strong 
agglomeration patterns around a few urban cores;6 
• highly developed industrial production, with a main focus on specialized and high value-
added products;7 
• the important role of widespread vocational training, especially in the form of a dual 
system of apprenticeship as well as on middle and higher levels;8 
• a strong base of small- to mid-sized companies, which still today make up a surprisingly 
high percentage of firms, despite the long-term decline in self-employment well into the 
1980s (which, however, has been reversed since then) and despite the strong presence of 
large firms and big business;9 and 
• a traditionally strong and still-increasing orientation towards export markets.10 
Recent developments have been characterized above all by two important changes. First, there 
has been a strong increase in tertiarisation since the 1970s. This is only partially reflected in the 
statistics, which show an increasing expansion of the service sector, since this transformation also 
took place within the industrial sector itself (witness the increasing importance of strategic, 
planning, administrative, and research and development functions at the headquarters of large 
Swiss industrial companies and the simultaneous tendency to relocate less qualified production or 
routine activities abroad).11 
 With regard to employment, the strong development of the service sector more than 
compensated for the simultaneous, though largely relative, decline of the industrial sector. For 
this reason, the relative de-industrialization of the Swiss economy generally did not lead to a net 
loss of jobs. Only between 1973 and 1976, and again at the beginning of the 1990s, did the 
absolute number of jobs in industry drop more than the simultaneous increase in the tertiary. 
 Second, recent developments have been influenced by the trend towards rationalization, 
which characterized the 1980s. This process was driven by the computerization of production and 
offices—leading to increasing automation—as well as by the massive wave of corporate mergers 
beginning in the mid-1980s. Since this, in turn, caused considerable adjustment problems, the 
effects of rationalization were often delayed. Amplified by other factors that will not be discussed 
here, these effects apparently contributed directly to the crisis-like recession that swept the Swiss 
economic and social landscape during the 1990s. This led to a level of unemployment as well as a 
deficit of the social welfare institutions and of public finances that the country had not seen since 
the world economic crisis of 1929-33. The ensuing financial problems have not yet been 
resolved, which is politically all the more problematic as Switzerland’s economic growth has 
been lower than that of her neighbours during the last 10 years (Bonoli 2004). 
  
 Tendencies of development 
Four tendencies of development are particularly salient: 
• continuing tertiarization; 
• continuous growth in productivity; 
• increasing discrepancies in the development of high- and low-productivity industries, in 
the industrial as well as the service sector. This tendency is closely linked to the process 
of globalization, and in part to the unequal growth rates of the (dynamic) export market, 
on the one hand, and the (rather stagnant) domestic market, on the other; and 
• the partial relocation abroad of Swiss firms.12  
As a consequence of the diverging development of domestic and export markets, national 
economic policy-making is confronted by increasingly contradictory demands. The domestic 
economy naturally favours a more protectionist policy, while the export economy prefers a liberal 
one. Moreover, in the wake of progressive globalization, the "integration gap" between the Swiss 
economy, which is strongly integrated (domestically as well as internationally), and Swiss policy-
making, which lacks internal as well as external integration, is widening (see Gabriel/Rybach in 
this volume). 
 Further, since the 1980s, the maximization of "shareholder value" has become an 
increasingly important objective in management and investor circles. Consequently, productivity 
gains are no longer divided more or less equally between capital and labour (through wage 
increases, reductions in work time, or job safety measures), but are increasingly passed on to 
investors. We shall return to this issue later. 
 
 
3 Social structure 
 
 Basic features 
The most important and consequential feature of a social structure is social stratification—that is, 
the system of the most important social inequalities. The bulk of our attention will be devoted to 
this issue. However, some preliminary remarks on two other basic dimensions of social 
differentiation are in order: the organization of social processes into institutionally separated 
sectors (sectoral differentiation) and at different systemic levels (systemic differentiation). Here 
too, the choice of topics covered is necessarily selective. 
 
 Levels of social organization 
The discussion of federalism has already touched on the dimension of systemic differentiation, 
which is particularly pronounced in Switzerland (see Vatter in this volume). Even today, despite 
the opening of the country in the 19th Century and globalization in the latter half of the 20th 
Century, the cantons remain semi-autonomous micro-societies in several respects. Structural and 
cultural differences (particularly differences in wealth) between the cantons persist, which are 
only partially compensated for by the financial compensation schemes of the Federation (see 
Germann, as well as Schenkel/Serdült in this volume). Further, the autonomy of the 
municipalities is vigorously defended, especially against merger projects and demands for inter-
municipality financial compensation schemes. There are, however, signs of fatigue, such as the 
difficulty small municipalities have in filling their usually honorary official posts and in dealing 
with the long-lasting and complex problems that cross municipal or cantonal borders (see Geser 
in this volume). With few exceptions, social structures are “territorialized”, i.e., they are bound to 
a particular territory, which is both reflected in, and influenced by, the organization of political 
life into "concentric circles" (i.e., the federal, cantonal and municipal levels). However, there is 
increasing evidence in many regions that the administrative political division of territory no 
longer reflects the socio-economic one, including the national borders in the regions around 
Geneva, Basle and Lugano/Chiasso; the spatial distribution of commuter flows is clear evidence 
of this phenomenon (Schuler et al. 1997).  
  
 Institutional sectors: separate and connected 
Institutional sectors refer to the conventional division of society into large social aggregates, such 
as the educational system, the economy, the family, the political system, the church, the health 
care system, the justice and correctional systems, the armed forces, and so on. It is obvious that 
there is a certain functional division of labour between these sectors: in various ways, they each 
produce and distribute a specific (material, organizational or symbolic-cultural) social good. This 
is a form of structural division of labour, not between persons, but rather between societal 
sectors, which, as a consequence of their specialization, are to a certain extent complementary. 
We illustrate this articulation from the perspective of individual life courses 
 Adults regularly participate in several of these fields at once. They occupy a position 
within their respective internal structures, are confronted with their different rules, demands and 
constraints, and are rewarded according to the logic of each individual system. In the course of 
life, these institutional "participations" evolve in a socially regulated manner; in part they follow 
one after the other, albeit with temporary overlap in some cases. This spontaneously invokes the 
sequence: family of origin à school à work life/family à retirement. However, not everyone 
will follow this pattern without interruption, since not all adults establish a family and remain 
family members during a continuous and lengthy period of their adult life. The same can be said 
of the world of employment: a phase of working activity may be followed by a period of renewed 
education or training.13 Nevertheless, there is something like a linear pattern which is reflected in 
most curricula (see also Perrig-Chiello 2004).  
 However, the typical sequence of participatory profiles of men and women differ 
considerably. Despite a certain pluralization of ways of life, in Switzerland, a relatively 
traditional family organization continues to predominate, implying that women's professional 
activities are subordinate to their role in the family. The opposite is true for men: their 
professional role takes precedence over their family role.14 The frequent interruptions to women's 
careers, mainly after marriage or the birth of a first or second child, are a direct result of this; 
similar interruptions to a man's career are practically non-existent (except in the case of some 
Scandinavian countries with gender-independent legislation on parenting). Thus, for women, 
family life competes with their professional career, whereas for men, the former tends to support 
the latter (Widmer et al. 2003).  
 There is considerable evidence that this "asymmetric complementarity" between the life 
paths of women and men is strongly influenced by the institutional environment of the family. 
Many institutions and organizations involved in the regulation of everyday life—be it through the 
forms of participation mentioned above (e.g., the school), or through exchange relationships 
between customers or clients (e.g., businesses or public offices)—are based on what are often 
only tacit preconceptions of “normal” behaviour, such as the predominant form of living in 
families whose adult members are not all full-time employed. This is particularly evident when 
taking into account the only partially adjusted rhythms followed by different social institutions, 
such as the normal working hours of the active population, children's school hours, which usually 
vary between different levels, and the opening hours of businesses and public services. Only in a 
complementarily organized family is an adult member sufficiently available to bridge these 
asynchronicities so that all members are able to coordinate their activities without too much 
friction. This complementarity is regularly and traditionally linked to gender and includes male 
dominance. It results in a hardly visible but nonetheless strongly felt institutional pressure to live 
in couples organized in a complementary way. Of course, not all people automatically succumb 
to this pressure. However, they do sense that any other way of life is in many ways more 
laborious, i.e., more “costly”. This explains why, despite some variations, relatively traditional, 
gender-specific modes of common life continue to persist. Further, it shows that the normative 
assumptions underpinning societal institutions have an important stabilizing effect on gender 
inequalities within the family.  
 This view of a society’s institutional structure from the perspective of the individual’s life 
course shows that the manifold links between the sectors—here at the level of individuals' 
integration into society—are at least as important as the internal characteristics of the sectors. 
Another such link will be discussed in the final section using the example of the political system 
and its relationship with the other sectors of society. Such links are established in response to 
various stimuli and challenges. In the case of the relationship between the economy and the 
political system, the acceleration of economic globalization seems to be the most important 
factor. The changing relationship between the educational system and the professional world over 
the last twenty to thirty years is different again. The educational system expanded considerably in 
the 1960s, leading to increasing numbers of students in higher levels of (vocational and general) 
training. Various studies have shown that this has led to an "elevator effect", through which the 
entire educational hierarchy has been shifted upwards. However, this expansion did not, as some 
expected, lead to a democratization of entry to higher levels of education. In other words, the 
percentage of children from the lower strata of society obtaining higher degrees did not 
significantly increase. Moreover, at the exit level, it did not lead to an expansion of the middle 
and higher levels of the hierarchy within the working sector. Instead, the consequence was a 
devaluation of higher degrees: today, more certified qualifications are necessary for the same 
posts than thirty years ago. Obviously, this expansion of education, whose desirability is not 
questioned here, followed a different logic than did the changes in the economic structure. 
Neither has had a significant influence on the reproduction of social inequalities. 
 
 Social stratification 
These reflections lead us directly to the topic of social stratification and its dynamics. There is a 
close relationship between the aforementioned social sectors and social stratification, i.e., the 
system of social inequalities. All of these sectors are themselves hierarchically organized, and 
many of them are also components of the professional world.15 Therefore, in research on social 
status of individuals and families, education, professional status and income remain the three 
most important factors. The educational system is where qualifications relevant to professional 
life are obtained, and most adults' incomes are determined in large part, if not entirely, by their 
employment status. Therefore, profession is arguably the most important stratifying factor 
although, on average, only about half of the population is professionally active. The majority of 
those who do not exercise a profession live under social conditions that are either determined by 
the professional activity of a member of their family (children, non-employed wives) or by their 
own former status (the retired, the unemployed, the hospitalized).  
 So far, there is no evidence of changes towards less inequality. On the contrary, as already 
mentioned, the differences in education between the social strata in Switzerland remain 
pronounced, regardless of the expansion of education. Despite management doctrines to the 
contrary, such as the "flattening-out of hierarchies", and the slightly higher number of middle-
management posts in large companies, the professional pyramid remains steep, and the gap in 
income and wealth is widening. Overall, inequalities in education, professional status, income 
and wealth remain the most important components of social stratification as well as those with 
the greatest consequences for individuals' ways of life. This fact contrasts sharply with the 
numerous reforms the complex educational system of Switzerland has undergone since the 1960s 
(Labhart Report 1964) with a view to reducing the inequalities of access to higher education, 
under the slogan of a better “actualization of the country’s talent potential”. This kind of 
inequality has indeed been reduced with respect to two dimensions: women have largely caught 
up with men, and students in peripheral areas have caught up with those from more central ones. 
However, class differences of the access to higher educational levels have largely remained 
(Levy et al. 1997). This is but another indication of the resilience in structures of inequality and 
flies in the face of the ideological vision of the “achieving society”. 
 
 Crystallization of inequalities 
Are these central inequalities (above all in education, professional status and income) correlated, 
or do they exist independently of one another? To use a technical term, this is the question of the 
degree of « crystallization » of social stratification. High crystallization implies a strong 
congruence between the different criteria of inequality, i.e., when most individuals are positioned 
similarly (low/middle/high) according to each criterion. Low or no crystallization means that all 
conceivable combinations of positions are possible. There is reason to believe that the degree of 
crystallization has fallen during the course of the 20th Century in all Western societies, 
particularly when seen in broad historical perspective.16 Available empirical evidence in 
Switzerland points in the same direction, at least up until the 1970s (Buchmann 1991; 
Lamprecht/Graf 1991). Since then, the tendency appears to be toward a certain re-crystallization 
(Levy et al. 1997). Further, the congruence of positions in the lower and higher strata is 
noticeably stronger than in the middle strata, which comprises the majority of the population. To 
simplify, one could say that a strong crystallization of inequalities is a prerequisite for a class-
based structure, whereas mid-range or low crystallization, as in Switzerland, can co-exist with 
strongly unequal social stratification, which nonetheless leaves room for great diversity of 
profiles (Bergman et al. 2002).  
 The question of the crystallization of inequalities is thus not just empty theorizing. The 
oft-discussed individualization of today's world and the pluralization of ways of life are closely 
related to declining levels of crystallization. The same is true of a society’s openness to upward 
mobility of the individual, the relative invisibility of social stratification as such (or at least the 
underestimation of its extent), and finally the loosening of the link between social status and 
political orientation on the right-to-left scale. As long as social stratification is not seen as a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon (as here), but rather as having a unitary and homogenous 
dimension, the latter development will be misinterpreted as a sign that social stratification has 
lost its political relevance.17  
 
 Social mobility 
The system of social inequalities should not only be analyzed in a static perspective. It becomes 
even clearer when the upward and downward movements of individuals within the system are 
examined. Summarized briefly, the Swiss mobility regime, inasmuch as it has been studied, is 
Janus-faced. While high rates of mobility do exist, this mobility serves mainly to further the 
intergenerational reproduction of inequality. In other words, many members of the younger 
generations, after having experienced some upward mobility, find themselves in the same social 
situation as that of their family of origin, because their occupational entry level is below the level 
acquired by their parents (Joye et al. 2003). It seems that a considerable part of the young enter 
the labour market below the level of their parents; hence, a substantial part of their upward 
mobility is nothing more than “catch-up mobility”. School education appears to be the main 
regulatory factor, more so than the possession or non-possession of means of production.18 
Moreover, education determines—to a great extent, although not entirely—how far it is possible 
to move up or down from a given position.  
 Social mobility is not the only aspect where processes of reproduction and stabilizers of 
social inequality can be shown to have a considerable impact. The choice of spouses and friends 
is also strongly influenced by stratification and to a large extent follows the principle of 
association among social equals (homogamy and homosociality). Despite the undeniable degree 
of openness—as evidenced by a certain degree of mobility and an only medium level of 
crystallization of inequalities—strong forces are nevertheless at work that reinforce not only 
structures of inequality, but also a clear continuity of social status across generations.  
 
 Discrimination on the basis of gender and nationality 
Two large segments of the population suffer discrimination under the Swiss stratification and 
mobility regime: women and (male as well as female) foreigners. Neither group enjoys the same 
status condition and possibilities of upward mobility as their respective counterparts—men and 
Swiss citizens of either sex. Women as well as foreigners are concentrated in certain labour 
markets, both must be more qualified than their male or Swiss competitors to reach higher 
professional levels, and both tend to be paid less. Finally, the relative discrimination against 
women is even worse than that suffered by foreigners (see, inter alia, Levy et al. 1997; 
Bühlmann et al. 1997). 
 The reasons for this unequal treatment are complex and seem to overlap only partially; 
they cannot be dealt with in detail here. We will, however, mention one example of a particularly 
paradoxical structural effect which concerns the entry of men and women into professional life. 
Girls have been able, over the past few decades, to close the gap separating them from boys as far 
as educational and vocational training is concerned. Nevertheless, professions and professional 
choices remain strongly gender-specific, leading to an unequal treatment of the sexes in the 
working world. This is a remarkable example of a transformation of formal equality into 
inequality in terms of opportunities in real life. Young men and women formally go through the 
same vocational training and leave it with formally equal certificates. In the course of their 
apprenticeships they have, however, largely been "pre-selected" into gender-specific professions 
and later enter the corresponding labour markets. Since these labour markets themselves are 
stratified, i.e., since many typically female activities rank lower in the occupational hierarchy 
than typically male activities, the originally "horizontal" pre-selection during training results in a 
"vertical" hierarchy in practice, with all of its attendant consequences (working conditions, 
opportunities for promotion, pay). This is an example of "gendered occupational structures", i.e., 
of a highly institutionalized process of reproduction of gender inequalities that is largely 
independent of the concrete choices of, and negotiations between, individuals.  
With regard to foreigners, one must first note their legal status, which clearly delimits 
their civil rights, such as the freedom of professional choice, the free choice of place of residence, 
the right to unlimited residence, and major political rights. In a sense, the main legal statuses for 
foreigners, especially if compared to full citizenship, represent an officially sanctioned hierarchy 
of civil statuses. To begin at the very bottom, unregistered aliens ("illegals") can claim hardly any 
civil rights, and any attempt to safeguard even their human rights jeopardizes their stay, which 
makes them extremely vulnerable to blackmail. Cross-border commuters can only choose 
employment within the legally prescribed frontier zone and must maintain their domicile on the 
other side of the border (and are, for that reason, not included in Swiss population statistics). 
Holders of a yearlong permit have more liberties and are not required to leave the country to have 
their permits renewed. Permanent residents, who are exempt from the obligations applicable to 
the other categories, have been definitely accepted, and yet they still do not enjoy full political 
rights (although there are a few cantonal exceptions); full political rights are reserved to Swiss 
nationals. Thus, it is not very surprising that the opportunities for upward mobility of foreigners 
are also related to their legal status (Levy et al. 1997) and that there is a series of further forms of 
discrimination against them (Fibbi and Wanner 2004).  
 
 Developmental parameters 
The most important changes in Switzerland’s social structure over the latter half of the 20th 
Century have been those which touch upon the central dimensions of inequality. 
• The expansion of education has already been mentioned. Even if this has not brought 
about a general levelling-out of opportunities for mobility, differences in education 
between the sexes and between regions have nevertheless been reduced. Further, the 
general level of education of the population has increased.  
• While in the occupational sector, as described above, important structural changes have 
taken place, these have had a far smaller effect on the hierarchical dimension than on the 
qualitative aspects of professional life. These include: higher demands for qualification, a 
shift away from physical labour towards relational and symbolic-intellectual activities, an 
intensification of work, and, in part, heightened autonomy and responsibility. Knowledge 
(including mastery of information technology) has become a central productive force, and 
thus also a personal resource with particularly strong effects on mobility. It is important 
not to equate progressing tertiarization simply with a generalized improvement of 
professional status and an amelioration of working conditions. In Switzerland, as in all 
highly industrialized and post-industrial countries, alongside the increase in expert 
positions, the expansion of the service sector has lead to the growth of a "service 
proletariat".  
• The differences of income and fortune have grown continuously and considerably, and not 
just as a result of the crisis of the 1990s. A growing lower fringe of the Swiss population 
is living in poverty.19 This concerns not only the unemployed but also the “working poor”. 
At the same time, the concentration of wealth in the form of high incomes and large 
fortunes is increasing, a trend which is strengthened by business policies with 
redistribution effects (shareholder value), and the increasing importance of the financial 
as opposed to the real economy.  
• The de-crystallization of the past decades appears to be reversing into a re-crystallization. 
This is likely to lead to a recrudescence of classic distributional conflicts linked to 
inequality (social partnership, political left-to-right dimension). However, there will be 
some lag in the appearance of these phenomena, as political consciousness does not 
develop in step with structural transformations.  
• The relationships between institutional sectors have changed in ways outlined above; 
these will not be reiterated here. 
• Although regional disparities (measured, for example, in terms of cantonal GNP per 
capita), have not developed in a linear fashion, they generally tend to increase, even 
though the effects of this tendency are mitigated by the small size of the territories 
concerned and by the general increase in commuter flows (by 1990, half of the working 
population commuted between home and work, and the trend continues to be rising). 
While at the regional level a cleavage between core and periphery is clearly discernable, 
the development pattern at the communal level is more complex. Urban sub-cores are 
developing at the fringes of large agglomerations (peri-urbanization), whereas small 
agglomerations are emerging in rural areas; two-thirds of the population thus already live 
in urban surroundings. The hardest hit by the process of de-industrialization are the 
formerly industrialized rural regions, which are facing a difficult economic re-conversion. 
The feared tendencies of economic and social de-coupling have so far manifested 
themselves only in peripheral regions; however, they should be analysed more closely 
than was previously the case. It is thanks to the amelioration of the transport infrastructure 
that this tendency has not been more pronounced, particularly in large agglomerations. In 
this context, the centres of poverty have shifted as well. It is mainly a consequence of the 
federal subsidies for mountain regions that the mountain farmers are no longer living in 
poverty. Nowadays, the poor are to be found above all in the cities and in the peripheries 
of the large urban agglomerations, as well as in those regions where industrial or post-
industrial conversion is not advancing.  
• The trend towards ever-larger territorial groupings around central metropolitan areas is 
likely to become even stronger. Examples include the Bernese Mittelland and the Lake 
Geneva basin. These areas increasingly span cantonal and even national borders (Basle, 
Geneva, Ticino) and are developing into focal points of economic activity. As a 
consequence, the divergence between socio-economic regions on the one hand, and 
territorial political rule on the other, will continue to grow. 
 
 
4 Prospects for development 
 
Many developments of Switzerland’s social structure are less uniform, linear and long-term than 
is commonly assumed. In this sense, it is problematic to simply project trends into the future 
because they have been documented to date. One need only think, for example, of the expansion 
of education, against which strong political forces are currently at work. 
 Furthermore, the empirical analysis of the long-term evolution of Switzerland’s social 
structures is still in its infancy (see the topical special issue of the Swiss Journal of Sociology, 
Levy and Suter 2000, and the two issues of the Social Report with its commented series of social 
indicators, Suter 2000, 2004). The basic tendencies, which are unlikely to undergo massive 
change in the coming years, presumably include the following: 
• an intensification of competition for jobs, and thus an increasingly asymmetrical 
relationship between employer and employee; 
• an increase in inequalities, especially of income and fortune;  
• connected to this, an intensification of classical distributional conflicts, together with an 
increase of the well-known non-political correlates of inequality and poverty (various 
forms of deviant behaviour, such as alcoholism, drug and medication dependency, 
delinquency and propensity for violence, psychosomatic disorders); 
• a strengthening of tendencies towards social closure and defence, in extreme cases 
increased xenophobia, sexism and racism; 
• the pluralization and individualization of ways of life and value systems (this is the most 
unstable of the discussed changes, particularly if compared to the issue of "materialist" 
distribution); 
• a drifting apart of the demands resulting from the problems of everyday life, on the one 
hand, and the logic of the institutional structures and processes to which those demands 
are addressed, on the other; 
• an increased imbalance in power between the political and the economic spheres, and thus 
a decline in legitimacy of the political institutions; and 
• as a consequence, a general decline in political steering capacity. 
Transformations in the domain of work (distribution, organization) deserve particular attention 
given its central position in modern society. If the current trends continue, it can be expected that 
precarious working conditions and work under untenable social conditions (these include 
economically insecure forms of self-employment) will become more widespread. Aside from 
pushing increasingly large sections of the population (including the middle strata) into a situation 
of social and economic hardship, this deterioration of living conditions also has consequences for 
social policy. The modus operandi of the largest welfare institutions rests upon normative 
assumptions about predominant ways of life (i.e., in families) and forms of work (normalized 
work relationship with full-time and unlimited employment), which do not hold true for 
increasing numbers of potential beneficiaries. This tendency adds to the problem of financing, 
which is already being discussed, the danger of a new form of discrimination, generated by the 
welfare State that threatens the very population segments already endangered by economic 
privation. Another crucial element that is not in tune with the actual development is the fact that 
old-age and unemployment insurance are financed only as a function of human labour instead of 
depending on the creation of overall added value in the economy. 
 Alongside the currently debated problem of financing, there is thus also the danger of a 
new form of discrimination rooted in the welfare State itself. This would further exacerbate the 
situation of these parts of the population which already suffer from economic discrimination. The 
financing of pension and unemployment funds exclusively through human labour (as opposed to 
the total value added of a firm’s production) does not at all take current developments into 
account. 
 The expansion of short-term and partial employment leads to a rise in the number of 
“second-rate” employees at the expense of regular staff. Together with the general predominance 
of short-term over long-term business policies, this could hamper the development of human 
capital throughout the economy. Studies have shown that firms are very selective in providing 
further training even for their regular staff. In addition, this is often seen not as a means of raising 
the level of qualification within the firm, but rather as an individual reward (Bundesamt für 
Statistik 1995; Levy et al. 1997). This trend is particularly disconcerting given that, in 
comparison to other European countries, Switzerland has hardly institutionalized the principle of 
lifelong professional learning.  
 In view of these somewhat gloomy prospects, it is useful to come back to the relationship 
between the economy and politics, or more generally between politics and other institutional 
sectors of society. From the perspective of society as a whole, the political system generally 
occupies a particularly important position. It not only has its own internal logic and structure, 
which distributes positions, tasks and rewards unequally among potential contenders, but it is 
also the only social sub-system with formalized decision-making and recruitment processes based 
on democratic values. Further, decisions reached within the political system do not primarily 
affect its own, internal functioning, but rather regulate society as a whole. This makes it possible 
to adopt a perspective on current political problems that goes beyond the common diagnoses. The 
specific position of the political system within society as a whole makes it the principal target of 
demands for the resolution of problems, including the improvement of legitimacy deficits, which 
arise from other parts of society (today, particularly from the economy) and which are not 
adequately dealt with in those subsystems. Viewed in this way, the Swiss political system suffers 
less from a surfeit of democracy than from an excess of demands originating in non-
democratically organized parts of society which do not deal with these in a satisfactory manner. 
Given this situation, it would clearly be problematic to evaluate governmental activity according 
to purely economic criteria. This would call into question even the relatively "modest" role of the 
State in ensuring social welfare, despite the fact that Switzerland—together with the United 
States, Canada and Japan—is among those highly industrialized nations which have the 
"cheapest" State and a level of social expenditure that is clearly below average up to the 1990s 
(Gilliand/Rossini 1997); in the meantime, however, these indicators have moved up into the 
European mean. 
 These considerations have to be related to an increased tendency to reduce welfare State 
expenditures with an exclusive view to cost criteria. Such a lopsided perspective cannot do justice 
to the complex regulatory functions of modern States. This shows up in the diverging postulates 
and exigencies that increasingly mark the political debate (e.g., if economic voices demand more 
liberalization on the one hand, but insist on the protection of specific industries on the other, or if 
they let poverty develop by considering salaries only as cost factors, but at the same time ask for 
further reductions of welfare-state protection for unemployment, or if the same political circles 
launch the idea to increase the age threshold for retirement, but increasingly lay off older workers 
who have next to no chance to find another employment). If politics, including social policy, is 
used first of all for the maximization of the most powerful particular interests and the reference to 
the common good is reduced to serving as a marketing argument for that policy, state action 
begins to lose its integrative function for society as a whole. Switzerland has already begun to 
pay the price for that, in the form of a spiral of increased conflicts, violence, delinquency and 
repression. 
 Even though remarkably few counter-trends have been visible to date, this tendency is not 
inescapable. For example, there are indications that the legitimacy of purely economic logic and 
of the new investor-friendly corporate strategy is declining. This could provide the stimulus for a 
re-legitimization of politics, at least when the latter appears as a credible counterweight against 
the aforementioned trends and their undesirable consequences. Possible strategies to counteract 
the most marked shifts in power include, at the domestic level, a more focused economic policy; 
and at the global level, the further development of international, perhaps even global social 
partnership, which is now only in its infancy, as well as adhesion to the European Union as a 
more effective political counter-weight to the globalized economy. 
                                                
1 For reasons of simplicity, we will abstain from providing detailed references on the facts and analyses 
commented on below. The presentation is based primarily on the analyses and studies used in Levy et al. (1997) 
and Levy 1997; these works provide detailed references to the literature.  
2 In 1925/27, textiles made up 41.4% of total exports; the strongly expanding machine tool and metal industry were 
second with 19.5% (Bergier 1983). 
3 In 1995, direct investment originating in Switzerland thus occupied eighth place in international comparison 
(World Competitiveness Report 1995, cited in Strahm 1997). 
4 This aspect of mountain society probably only entered into public consciousness through the movie "The 
Landscapers" ("Die Landschaftsgärtner") (Kurt Gloor, 1969). 
5 In the middle of the 19th Century, workers' households spent 60% of their budget on food alone, 20% for rent 
and 14% for clothing.  
6 The Zurich/Basle/Berne "golden triangle", the Lemanic dipole Lausanne/Geneva, and increasingly the area 
comprising Locarno/Bellinzona/Lugano/Chiasso in Ticino, which today is a quasi-homogeneous urban zone 
(Schuler et al. 1997). 
7 Only a few OECD countries had a secondary sector share which, when at its apex, equalled that of Switzerland, 
but Swiss industry has never been based upon classic mass production. 
8  About a third of the young end their initial education with an apprenticeship certificate. 
9  According to the industry census of 2001, in the two major sectors of production and the services, 29.8% of all 
jobs are located in firms with 100 and more employees, but this category represents only 1.0% of all firms in 
these two sectors. 
10 For decades, the export rate oscillated between 25% and 35% of the gross domestic product (GDP); it rose further 
in the 1990s. In 1995, the export share of GDP was 35%; the externally earned share of GNP was 42% 
(Kappel/Landmann 1997). Switzerland’s per capita volume of foreign trade, as well as her GDP proportion of 
exports and imports, are among the highest in international comparison (BFS 2005, 282). 
11 During the 1980s, estimates of the share of service functions in internationally active industrial firms had already 
surpassed 50%. 
12 During the period 1986-1993, Switzerland thus lost 11.5% of domestic jobs, while the number of local employees 
of Swiss industrial firms operating abroad rose by 39.9%. The 7.5% increase in employment in the domestic 
service sector over the same period amounts to a stagnation at a high level (over 1.5 million jobs), while Swiss 
firms abroad witnessed a 204.8% increase (Kappel/Landmann 1997).   
13  However, Swiss institutions have not yet been systematically prepared for this contingency; much less so, in fact, 
than is the case in Scandinavia or Germany. Accordingly, such occurrences are less frequent. 
14  Contrary to the view prevalent in the media, systematic studies show that—not only in Switzerland—relatively 
traditional family structures are considerably less diversified than is often assumed (Levy et al. 1997; Fux 1997; 
Baumgartner/Fux 1998). 
15  This is the case insofar as the health care system is subject to the same working conditions as any other service 
sector or the production of goods. 
16  Particularly if one begins the comparison with the Ständestaat of the ancien régime (Kocka 1979). 
17  See, e.g., Clark and Lipset (1991) and the scientific debate their work sparked.  
18  In this respect, the Swiss mobility regime differs from those found in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries, 
and resembles those of Germany and Austria (Western/Wright 1994). Like Switzerland, and in contrast to almost 
all other industrialized States, Germany and Austria have a strongly structured, partially dualistic system of 
vocational training. 
19  In research as well as in practice, there are manifold criteria for defining poverty. Moreover, the proportion of the 
population living under the poverty line is not universally the same. Depending on the criterion used (less than 
50% of the mean disposable income, or less than 50% of the median personal income, or according to more 
complex definitions whose quantitative establishment is more difficult) and the region under observation, 
(individual cities, cantons or all of Switzerland), the estimates for the 1980s are between 5.6% and 24.0% of 
households (Regamey 1994 provides a summary; see also Sommer/Schütz 1996). Given the disparities between 
municipalities and cantons, it is not surprising that the national study on poverty undertaken in the early 1990s 
provides the lowest estimates. This apparently counterintuitive situation (Leu/Burri/Priester 1997) is explained by 
the fact that local and regional studies focus on contexts in which poverty is an acute problem, whereas the 
national study covers the entire territory. 
